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Averaging down buys more as a holding falls and pyramiding buys more as it rises. Both were run with the same rule over every five-year window of QQQ and TQQQ, comparing the money actually put in, the five-year balance, the value per dollar put in and the largest paper loss, and linked to the disposition effect and the trend follower's rule of adding to winners.
Over five-year QQQ windows, the averaging-down ladder actually put in a median of $20,000, half the $40,000 budget. So its median five-year balance was below putting everything in at the start ($56,371 against $81,013), while its value per dollar put in was slightly higher (2.11x against 2.03x). On stocks that never recovered, every extra buy was an extra loss.
Averaging down means buying more of a holding as it falls to lower the average cost. Pyramiding means buying more as it rises to grow a winning position. Both add the same amount; only the direction differs. Korean investors call them mul-tagi and bul-tagi. This article writes both as the same rule and runs them over every five-year window of QQQ and TQQQ, comparing the money actually put in, the end balance, the value per dollar put in, and the largest amount that could have been lost. Each rule puts in a different amount, so comparing balances alone makes the rule that put in more look better. Figures are as of September 30, 2026.
Buying the same amount four times on the way down puts the average cost 16.5% below the first buy price. Someone who bought once needs +42.9% from a point 30% below the first buy just to break even; someone who bought four times needs +19.3%. That arithmetic is why averaging down is tempting. In exchange, the money at risk grew from $10,000 to $40,000, and if the price keeps falling the whole larger sum falls with it. Pyramiding is the reverse. The average cost rises by 13.9%, so the four-buy position is at −12.2% as soon as the price merely returns to the first buy price.
The four approaches were run on every five-year window, moving the start one month at a time: 271 QQQ windows starting April 1999 to October 2021, and 140 TQQQ windows starting March 2010 to October 2021. The balance includes unused cash. Money put in is what was actually spent on the stock, and value per dollar is the stock's value after five years divided by that money. The balance reflects how much went in; the value per dollar reflects when it went in. A losing window is one where the account ended below $40,000, and the last column is the largest gap between the money put into the stock and its value.
| Case | Median money put in | Median balance after 5 years | Median value per dollar | Worst window balance | Losing windows | Largest paper loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QQQ, first $10,000 only | $10,000 | $50,253 | 2.03x | $33,422 ($10,000 put in) | 36 (13%) | −$8,141 |
| QQQ, averaging-down ladder | $20,000 | $56,371 | 2.11x | $17,040 ($40,000 put in) | 28 (10%) | −$30,745 |
| QQQ, pyramiding ladder | $40,000 | $70,058 | 1.75x | $14,695 ($40,000 put in) | 41 (15%) | −$32,196 |
| QQQ, $40,000 at the start | $40,000 | $81,013 | 2.03x | $13,689 ($40,000 put in) | 36 (13%) | −$32,565 |
| TQQQ, first $10,000 only | $10,000 | $80,257 | 5.03x | $44,819 ($10,000 put in) | 0 | −$7,849 |
| TQQQ, averaging-down ladder | $30,000 | $155,664 | 5.73x | $58,990 ($10,000 put in) | 0 | −$29,654 |
| TQQQ, pyramiding ladder | $40,000 | $173,657 | 4.34x | $51,409 ($40,000 put in) | 0 | −$31,659 |
| TQQQ, $40,000 at the start | $40,000 | $201,028 | 5.03x | $59,275 ($40,000 put in) | 0 | −$31,397 |
On QQQ the averaging-down ladder fired at least once in 155 of the 271 windows and all three times in 91. In the other 116 windows the $30,000 stayed in cash to the end, and the result matched buying only the first $10,000. Averaging down ended above putting all $40,000 in at the start in 100 windows (37%), all of them windows where the ladder fired. Counting only those windows, it led in 65%, and in the 91 windows where it bought all three times and so put in the same $40,000, it led every time. Buying the same money in pieces below the first price makes that inevitable. The catch is that no one knows in advance whether the ladder will go all the way. The median money put in was $20,000 for averaging down (mean $23,137) against $40,000 for everything at the start, and most of the gap in median balances comes from that. The median value per dollar put in after five years was 2.11x for averaging down, 2.03x for everything at the start and 1.75x for pyramiding.
All 140 five-year TQQQ windows ended with a gain. The ladder fired in 101 of them, and averaging down beat putting everything in at the start in 62 (44%). SPY (335 windows starting December 1993 to October 2021) pointed the same way. The five-year median was $50,694 for averaging down and $67,777 for everything at the start, and 10 and 49 windows ended with a loss. Much of averaging down's smaller count of losing windows comes from putting in less money. Its median money put in on SPY was $20,000, and the median value per dollar was 1.77x for averaging down and 1.69x for everything at the start.
Averaging down adds money only on the way down, so in windows where the market kept rising most of the budget stayed in cash. Pyramiding adds on the way up, so its median was higher than averaging down, but in windows that rose and then fell it met the decline holding a large sum at a high average cost. The worst QQQ pyramiding window started in February 2000: it made all three buys on February 8, March 2 and March 27, just before the dot-com bubble burst, and was worth $14,695 five years later.
Buying QQQ on the first trading day of March 2000, the ladder fired on April 13, April 17 and May 24. The decline ran until October 2002, and the $40,000 in the stock was at one point $30,736 short (−76.8%). Five years later the account held $17,360 with averaging down, $13,999 with everything at the start, and $33,500 with the first $10,000 only. Averaging down and everything at the start both put in $40,000, so averaging down did better by the amount it bought cheaper. It still ended more than $16,000 below putting in only $10,000.
Buying TQQQ on the first trading day of November 2021, the ladder fired on January 19, 21 and 26, 2022. TQQQ was already 30% below the first buy in January 2022, and kept falling until December 2022. By September 2026 the account held $101,130 with averaging down, $84,128 with everything at the start, $71,308 with pyramiding and $51,032 with the first $10,000 only. Apart from the first-$10,000 case, all three put in $40,000. Along the way, averaging down's largest paper loss was $29,988 (−75.0%). Buying SPY in October 2007, the ladder fired in January, July and October 2008, and five years later averaging down held $49,672 against $41,938 for everything at the start.
Without a cap on the ladder the arithmetic changes. Running "buy another $10,000 whenever the price is 10% below the average cost" with no limit on QQQ from March 2000, each $10,000 barely moves the average cost once the position is large, so the condition is met again every day while the price stays more than 10% below the average cost. By March 12, 2009 it had bought 518 more times, putting in $5,190,000, with a largest paper loss of $1,468,912. TQQQ from November 2021 bought 198 times through March 2023, putting in $1,990,000, with a largest paper loss of $632,111. Both later rose a great deal, but these are sums that a plan sized at $10,000 cannot carry. What decides an averaging-down result is not the size of the decline but the cash left.
In a 1998 Journal of Finance paper, Terrance Odean analyzed the 1987 to 1993 trades of 10,000 accounts at a US discount broker. The rate of buying more of a stock already held was higher for stocks at a loss (PLPA 0.135) than for stocks at a gain (PGPA 0.094). Odean read this as consistent with prospect theory's risk seeking in losses, or with a belief that prices revert. It comes from the same reference point as the disposition effect, which keeps losers and sells winners early (Investor psychology): the purchase price. A 1990 study by Richard Thaler and Eric Johnson found that people who have lost are drawn to choices that offer a chance to get back to even, and called it the break-even effect.
Trend followers wrote the opposite rule. In his 1940 book How to Trade in Stocks, Jesse Livermore forbade adding to a losing position more strongly than anything else (Livermore's trend breakout), and added in steps after a rise. The Turtles added one unit each time price moved ½N in their favor from the last fill, up to four units per market (Turtle trading). In both cases pyramiding came with a stop, and this article's pyramiding ladder has none.
Search terms: averaging down, pyramiding, martingale, break-even effect, disposition effect, mul-tagi, bul-tagi, when to average down, averaging down vs. stop loss.
In the numbers, averaging down is less a way to earn more than a rule that ties when money goes in to declines. In 116 of 271 five-year QQQ windows the ladder never fired and three quarters of the budget stayed in cash, and it beat putting everything in at the start in 37% of windows. Where the ladder fired all three times and the same $40,000 went in, it always led, but which windows those are is known only after the fall ends. The worst window was less bad, $17,040 instead of $13,689, and putting in only $10,000 gave $33,422. That difference only matters if a recovery follows the decline, and that condition is not part of the rule. QQQ and TQQQ recovered; Enron, Lehman and SVB did not. Chasing the average cost with no cap grew the money put into QQQ from March 2000 to $5,190,000. The operator's reading is that the numbers favor deciding whether to add by a total and a number of steps set in advance, not by the purchase price.
This article does not recommend adding to any stock or ETF. The figures are past results from this site's engine (dividends reinvested, 0.15% cost per trade, no interest on cash, decisions at the close and fills at the next open). The ladder spacing and amounts are examples, and taxes, exchange rates and the risk of a single company failing are yours to check. Everything here is reference information based on past, public data and is not investment advice.
Investor psychology · Livermore's trend breakout · Turtle trading · SPY monthly vs. lump sum · The math of loss and recovery · VIX and fear · Grid trading · Plan before entry
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