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Contrarian · Bargain

Contrarian Low-P/E Strategy

David Dreman · David Dreman · 1936– · Canada/United States
Buys the cheap stocks the market ignores, by the rules

What is the Contrarian Low-P/E Strategy?

The Contrarian Low-P/E Strategy buys unpopular stocks with low P/E and P/B ratios. It comes from the observation that these prices recover once excessive pessimism fades. It turns David Dreman's principles into rules.

Who He Is

Born in 1936 in Winnipeg, Canada. In 1977 he founded Dreman Value Management in the United States, which managed money in undervalued stocks for many years, and he wrote an investment column for Forbes for decades.

His first book, Contrarian Investment Strategy, came out in 1979 and was revised several times; the 2011 edition, Contrarian Investment Strategies: The Psychological Edge, is the latest. He is also known for work that used statistics to show investors' psychological mistakes, an early part of behavioral finance.

He relied on two facts. Analysts' earnings forecasts are often wrong, and by a lot. And when stocks are sorted by P/E, the cheapest 20% earned higher long-term returns than the most expensive 20%. So he chose to buy cheap stocks rather than predict earnings.

Core Idea

Popular stocks and neglected stocks react differently to news. A popular stock carrying high expectations rises a little on good news and falls hard on bad news. A neglected stock with no expectations barely moves on bad news and rises sharply on good news. Dreman saw buying neglected stocks as the better side of that difference.

Dreman's evidence: sort stocks by P/E into five groups, and the cheap groups earned higher long-term returns.Lowest P/EHighest P/ELong-term avg annual return (concept - valuation quintiles)
Dreman's evidence: sort stocks by P/E into five groups, and the cheap groups earned higher long-term returns.

Trading Rules

1. Pick from the lowest 20% by P/E

P/E comes first, with P/B, price to cash flow (P/CF) and dividend yield checked as well. Pick stocks that are cheap on several measures together.

2. Leave out weak balance sheets

Check the debt ratio, current ratio and profitability. Many cheap stocks are cheap for a reason, and without this check you end up buying stocks that keep falling.

3. Spread across 20 to 30 stocks

There is no telling which stock will be revalued, or when. Hold 20 to 30 across several industries and wait for some of them to rise.

4. Sell at a fair price

When the P/E rises to around the market average, sell and pick again from the cheapest 20%.

The Record

Dreman's best-known record is the Kemper-Dreman High Return Fund, launched in 1988 and later renamed the DWS Dreman High Return Equity Fund. A 2019 article in The Wall Street Transcript, citing Lipper, said the fund ranked first among 255 funds in its peer group from 1988 to 1998. This site could not check Lipper's original data (not verified).

According to CBS MoneyWatch (April 27, 2009), the fund returned 8.3% a year from 1988, slightly ahead of the Russell 3000 Value Index (8.0% a year), but results varied widely by period. From 1988 to 1996 it returned 18.7% a year, 3.2 percentage points a year ahead of the index (15.5% a year). Its assets grew from $35 million at the start of 1995 to $731 million at the end of 1996 and $3.2 billion in 1997, and from 1997 on it returned 2.0% a year, behind the index (3.4% a year).

In 2008 a large weight in financial stocks led to a loss of 45%, 9 percentage points worse than the index (−36%). According to Money (April 17, 2009) and Forbes (April 9, 2009), the fund's board removed Dreman's firm from managing the fund as of June 2009, citing weak performance. Money also noted in the same article that the fund was still in the top half of its category over the past 10 years.

The record shows periods when the low-P/E approach was far ahead and long periods when it lagged, and after its assets grew sharply the fund trailed the index.

The fund beat the index from 1988 to 1996 and trailed it from 1997 on.Annual return by periodDreman fundRussell 3000 Value8.3%8.0%1988 on, whole18.7%15.5%1988 to 19962.0%3.4%1997 on
The fund beat the index from 1988 to 1996, but trailed it from 1997 on, after its assets grew to $3.2 billion. Over the whole period, 8.3% and 8.0% a year were close. Figures as reported by CBS MoneyWatch (April 27, 2009).

What Research Found

The observation that low-P/E stocks earn higher returns became widely known through Basu (1977). When NYSE industrial companies from April 1957 to March 1971 were sorted into five groups by P/E, the low-P/E groups earned higher returns both before and after adjusting for risk.

Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) sorted NYSE and AMEX stocks into ten groups by earnings yield (E/P) each April from 1968 to 1989. According to the summary table in Chan and Lakonishok (2004), the group with the highest earnings yield (the lowest P/E) earned 19.0% a year on average over the next 5 years, and the lowest group earned 11.4% a year. The authors reported that the value group lost less than the popular group even in the market's worst months, and attributed the gap to investors' excessive expectations rather than to risk.

Dreman and Berry (1995) reported that when earnings differed from expectations, the reaction favored low-P/E stocks, and that regardless of the direction of the news, low-P/E stocks beat the market and high-P/E stocks trailed it, a reversion to the mean that lasted at least 19 quarters after the announcement.

There are counterarguments. Fama and French (1996) found that the return gaps between groups sorted by P/E, price to cash flow and similar measures are largely explained by a three-factor model of market, size and value, and read them as compensation for risk. The size of the effect also changed over time. According to Fama and French (2021), the excess return over the market of value stocks chosen by P/B fell from 0.42% a month in 1963 to 1991 to 0.11% a month in 1991 to 2019. They added that monthly returns are so volatile that it cannot be said with confidence that the expected return actually fell.

The analyst forecast errors that Dreman relied on were also disputed. When Dreman and Berry argued in a second 1995 paper that forecast errors were too large and growing over time, Brown (1996) replied that, measured against the stock price, the errors were within 3%, that analysts were more accurate than simple statistical models, and that the errors were not growing.

Cautions

Some stocks stay cheapCompanies in declining industries can keep low P/Es for a long time. Dreman reduced this risk with financial checks and diversification. Concentrating in one or two stocks removes the diversification the method depends on.
It can lag for yearsIn bull markets led by growth stocks, undervalued stocks can lag for years. Switching strategies during that stretch is the most common failure.

How This App Scores It

This strategy card checks the following.
  • P/E of 15x or below, P/B of 1.0x or below, P/S of 1.0x or below
  • Dividend yield of 2% or above
  • Debt ratio of 100% or below, current ratio of 1.5x or above, profitable in the last 4 quarters

Primary Sources

  • David Dreman, Contrarian Investment Strategies: The Psychological Edge (2011)

This strategy model was independently built by Confluence Zone to quantify the investment philosophy in the works above. It is not an official model created, endorsed or reviewed by David Dreman or any related institution. Last reviewed: 2026-10-02

Related terms: PER · PBR · Dividend Yield

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These explainers are educational summaries, independently written from publicly available books, records and interviews. No person or institution named here is evaluating or recommending any security. Confluence Zone is an analysis tool for information and research; it is not investment advice, a solicitation, or a trading instruction. Investment decisions and their outcomes are your own responsibility.
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