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Investor psychology: loss aversion, the disposition effect and herd behavior
Loss aversion and the disposition effect, how often SPY and QQQ showed a loss by day, month, year and decade, and how long regaining their highs took.
In one line
Since 1993, 45% of SPY's days were down days, but only 9% of ten-year periods ended in a loss and no 15-year period did. For someone who feels a loss more than twice as strongly as a gain, looking often is enough to see losses often, and that is what shakes the plan.
Article
Two people look at the same chart and reach different conclusions. The difference is usually emotion, not information. Most of the mistakes individual investors repeat come from loss aversion, confirmation bias and herd behavior.
People lose money more often by failing to follow a method they know than by not knowing one. Before buying, you decide to sell if the price falls 10%; when it does, you decide to wait a little longer. When it rises a little, you sell in a hurry in case it falls back. Psychology is what opens this gap between plan and action, and it is why this site covers psychology before trading rules.
A plan is made when you are calm and kept when prices are moving. This article covers loss aversion and the disposition effect, which break plans in between, as the research describes them, and calculates with SPY, QQQ and S&P 500 data how often and for how long an investor actually sees losses. Figures are as of September 2026 and were calculated by the operator with this site's backtest engine.
Loss aversion: a loss looms larger than a gain of the same size
In their prospect theory, published in Econometrica in 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky described how people judge outcomes as gains and losses from a reference point rather than as final wealth, and feel the losses more. In a 1992 follow-up the two estimated that a loss feels about 2.25 times as large as a gain of the same size (the median of their participants). If prices rise and fall by the same amount in turn, the felt total is negative.
The more often you look, the more losses you see
In a 1995 paper Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler called loss aversion combined with a short evaluation period myopic loss aversion. If investors evaluate their accounts about once a year, the prospect theory estimates can explain why stocks earned so much more than bonds for so long. In a 1997 experiment by Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz, participants who got the most frequent feedback put the least into the risky asset and earned the least. Below, the same idea is calculated on SPY and QQQ prices with dividends.
By the day, 45.2% of SPY's days were down days, about 114 a year. By the month 34.5%, by the year 18.3% and by ten years 8.7% of periods were losses, and all 215 fifteen-year periods ended with a gain. QQQ's losing ten-year periods (10.9%) all began between March 1999 and January 2001.
If you simply count losses 2.25 times and average each period, SPY came out at −0.41% by the day and −0.62% by the month, and turned positive from three months on at +0.74%. QQQ did not turn positive until six months, at +1.89%. The same investment feels like a loss or a gain depending only on how often you evaluate it. This is the operator's simplified calculation, not the value function of the original research.
The disposition effect: winners sold early, losers sold late
In 1985 Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman named the tendency to sell winners early and hold losers long the disposition effect. In a 1998 Journal of Finance paper Terrance Odean analyzed the 1987 to 1993 trades of 10,000 accounts at a US discount broker. The proportion of gains realized (PGR) was 0.148 and the proportion of losses realized (PLR) was 0.098, so winners were sold about 1.5 times as readily. Yet over the following year (252 trading days) the winners sold beat the losers kept by 3.4 percentage points in returns relative to the market. Odean wrote that this selling habit was not explained by rebalancing or by the higher trading costs of low-priced stocks.
The disposition effect uses the purchase price as its yardstick. When being above or below that price decides whether to sell, a stock whose reason has broken stays in the account just because it is at a loss. The purchase price has nothing to do with future returns.
How long it took to regain the high
What tests loss aversion is the length of a decline more than its depth. With dividends, SPY set a new record close on only 10.6% of trading days since November 1993, and on 32.2% of days it was more than 10% below its prior high. The table shows when each decline of more than 18% from a high since 2000 was recovered (closes with dividends).
| Case | Peak | Trough | Decline | High regained | Time taken |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPY 2000 to 2002 | 3/24/2000 | 10/9/2002 | −47.5% | 10/26/2006 | 6.6 years |
| SPY 2007 to 2009 | 10/9/2007 | 3/9/2009 | −55.2% | 8/16/2012 | 4.9 years |
| SPY 2018 | 9/20/2018 | 12/24/2018 | −19.3% | 4/12/2019 | 7 months |
| SPY 2020 | 2/19/2020 | 3/23/2020 | −33.7% | 8/10/2020 | 6 months |
| SPY 2022 | 1/3/2022 | 10/12/2022 | −24.5% | 12/13/2023 | 1.9 years |
| SPY 2025 | 2/19/2025 | 4/8/2025 | −18.8% | 6/26/2025 | 4 months |
| QQQ 2000 to 2002 | 3/27/2000 | 10/9/2002 | −83.0% | 2/20/2015 | 14.9 years |
| QQQ 2007 to 2008 (from the 2007 high) | 10/31/2007 | 11/20/2008 | −53.4% | 12/8/2010 | 3.1 years |
| QQQ 2018 | 8/29/2018 | 12/24/2018 | −22.8% | 4/12/2019 | 7 months |
| QQQ 2020 | 2/19/2020 | 3/16/2020 | −28.6% | 6/3/2020 | 3 months |
| QQQ 2022 | 12/27/2021 | 11/3/2022 | −35.1% | 12/13/2023 | 2.0 years |
| QQQ 2025 | 2/19/2025 | 4/8/2025 | −22.8% | 6/24/2025 | 4 months |
Someone who bought QQQ all at once at the March 2000 high was at a loss for 14.9 years even with dividends. Buying in steps was not easy either. Putting in $500 a month from January 2000, the longest stretch with the account below the money put in ran from September 2000 to January 2004, 3.4 years, and on September 21, 2001, $10,500 had gone in and the account was worth $4,627, 55.9% less. By September 2026 the account was worth $1,991,255, a little over 12 times the $160,500 put in.
The best days sat next to the worst days
Staying out of the market to avoid losses makes it easy to miss the biggest up days too, because big up days and big down days cluster in the same stretches. Below are the 20 best and 20 worst of the 6,725 daily returns of the S&P 500 index (price only) from January 2000 to September 2026. SPY's daily bars for January 6 and 7, 2000 do not match the index, so this one calculation uses the index.
The best day was October 13, 2008 (+11.6%), and two days later, on the 15th, the index fell 9.0%. The three consecutive trading days of March 12, 13 and 16, 2020 returned −9.5%, +9.3% and −12.0%. Of the 20 best days, 17 came when the index was more than 20% below its high, and 11 came within 10 trading days of one of the 20 worst days. The index returned 6.4% a year over the period; without the 10 best days it was 3.2%, without the 10 worst 9.9%, and without both 6.6%. If a call to avoid declines is not precise, the big gains go with them.
Confirmation bias and attention-grabbing stocks
In a 1998 review Raymond Nickerson described confirmation bias as seeking and interpreting evidence in ways that fit beliefs already held. After you buy a stock, only the good news stays as a reason, and when the reason for buying breaks, a new one gets attached. In a 2008 study Brad Barber and Odean showed that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks: those in the news, those with unusually high volume and those with extreme one-day returns. In their 2000 study of 66,465 households at a US discount broker from 1991 to 1996, the households that traded most earned 11.4% a year, below the market's 17.9%.
Herd behavior
When everyone is buying, the stock has usually risen a lot already. When everyone is selling, it has usually fallen a lot already. The moment when news and forums are loudest is often the most dangerous one. When nobody cares, things are quiet.
The numbers for the days of greatest fear are in The VIX fear index and crowd psychology. After days when the VIX closed above 40, SPY was up 12 months later 97% of the time, but 59.9% of those days fell in 2008 and 2009. Buying on September 29, 2008 meant falling another 39.5% to the bottom.
When the principle holds and when it does not
- Recovery after holding on is not a law: the numbers above are the record of broad US indexes that did regain their highs. Japan's Nikkei 225 did not close above its December 29, 1989 close of 38,915.87 until February 22, 2024 (about 34 years on price, CNN). Individual stocks can fail to recover and disappear.
- Selling at a loss is not always a bias: selling a stock at a loss because its reason broke is the opposite of the disposition effect. The problem is when the purchase price becomes the yardstick.
- The research samples have limits: the disposition effect and trading frequency studies use US discount broker clients from the 1980s and 1990s. Nothing in this article shows the same size of effect for Korean investors today.
Ways a plan reduces the damage
- Set the evaluation interval in advance: checked daily, 45.2% of SPY's days looked like losses; checked monthly, 34.5% of months did. Decide only on the days you set, and even for rules that need frequent checks, such as stops, only check whether a preset condition was reached.
- Decide after the close, on daily bars: the intraday order book makes emotions bigger.
- Tie selling to the reason: if you write down the reason, exit condition, entry price and stop before buying, the written conditions decide whether to sell, not the purchase price (Plan before entry).
- Judge a rule by many results: QQQ's 200-day rule won on only 30% of its trades, yet its average gain was so much larger than its average loss that it returned 7.9% a year (Moving-average trading). Changing a rule after one loss gives you a rule that fits only that stretch.
- Set the weights first: a 70% stock, 30% cash mix cut the max drawdown since August 2002 from −55.2% to −42.4% (Asset allocation).
Related concepts and search terms
- Prospect theory: the theory that outcomes are judged as gains and losses from a reference point, with a steeper value function for losses. It also includes probability weighting, in which small probabilities feel larger than they are.
- Myopic loss aversion: loss aversion combined with a short evaluation period. Lengthening the evaluation period makes the same asset feel less risky.
- Disposition effect: the tendency to sell winners early and losers late. Odean's comparison of PGR and PLR is the standard way to measure it.
- Mental accounting, sunk cost: keeping a separate tally for each stock and letting money already spent tie down decisions. The habit of tracking breakeven for each stock connects to the disposition effect.
Search terms: prospect theory, loss aversion, myopic loss aversion, disposition effect, PGR PLR, confirmation bias, best and worst days stock market, behavioral finance.
Limits of these numbers
- The loss frequencies and recovery times are the 1993 to 2026 record of SPY and QQQ, broad US index ETFs. They do not carry over directly to other markets or stocks.
- Counting losses 2.25 times applies the research median in a simple way; it differs by person and by amount.
- The best and worst day calculation uses index prices without dividends and no costs. No real method sits out exactly those days, so read it only as a calculation showing that the two kinds of days cluster.
Operator's assessment
In the numbers, what breaks a plan is less the size of a decline than how often you look and how long the decline lasts. SPY was down on 45.2% of days, but only 8.7% of ten-year periods were losses, and with losses counted 2.25 times, the same investment felt like a loss to someone checking daily and like a gain to someone checking every three months. On the other side, someone who bought QQQ at the March 2000 high was at a loss for 14.9 years even with dividends, and someone investing monthly was below the money put in for 3.4 years. We think stretches like these are hard to sit through on willpower. So we set the decision interval and the selling conditions before buying. It is also why Confluence Zone judges only on daily closes and gives signals rarely. Our backtest record has seven rule changes that looked sensible and actually lowered performance. They show a common way emotion seeps into rules. Still, these numbers are the record of US indexes that did recover, and some indexes, like the Nikkei 225, took 34 years to regain their high.
What this article does not cover
This article does not cover personality assessment, counseling, or psychological calls on any particular stock. The research figures come from each paper's sample (US individual investors in the 1980s and 1990s, among others). The SPY, QQQ and S&P 500 figures are past results from this site's engine (dividends reinvested, taxes and currency left out). There is no basis for expecting the same numbers from individual stocks or other countries' indexes. Everything here is reference information based on past, public data and is not investment advice.
Articles and questions on the same topic
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